Japan's intentions towards Hawaii?

[Rising Sun*]

I don't know if this has been discussed before, but nothing is coming up in the early search pages.

It is generally stated that the Battle of Midway was limited to the IJN's quest for 'the decisive battle' to wrest control of the Pacific from America.

However, it has been argued that Midway was part of a larger Japanese plan to capture Hawaii to exclude America from effective action in the western Pacific, in part to force America to come to terms with Japan. A summary of the research and argument is here.
http://www.users.bigpond.com/pacific...fMidwayOp.html

If Japan had captured Hawaii, it would certainly have diminished America's ability to project its naval power into the western Pacific, with obvious consequences for the thrust across the central Pacific towards Japan.

Hawaii combined with the Aleutians, Truk, and Rabaul would have given Japan a north-south maritime 'Iron Curtain' of sorts in the Pacific, which combined with Japan's advances towards the Solomons etc would have put it in a very good position to deny or at least limit American LOC to Australia to build up a base for the SWPA attack towards Japan.

Occupying Hawaii makes a lot more sense in strategic terms than confiing Japan's actions to a naval win against the US when American production capacity could easily replace and exceed the naval losses at Midway when Japan clearly had no ability to invade the US mainland.

The argued threat to Hawaii reinforces the inference that the battles which mattered most in turning the tide against Japan's relentless advance in 1942 were the naval battles in the Coral Sea and at Midway, as they forced dramatic re-evaluations of Japanese strategic intentions and prevented Japan from gaining territory which could have put it in a much better position to negotiate terms with the Allies or, failing that, just hold what it had taken. Or even advance further, notably into Australia which would then have created massive problems for the Allies as America would have to cross the whole Pacific to reach Japan or a thrust would have had to come from India, which was beyond British and even Allied resources given the LOC, fuel and shipping required to get there from America as the main combatant and logistical supplier.

[Rising Sun*]

I just read a passing reference by a mid-level WWII Japanese naval officer to occupying Hawaii.

He didn't expand on it, but it got me wondering again whether there was some plan or intention to take Hawaii at some later stage after Pearl Harbor?

This could explain why Japan didn't destroy the oil storages as it was desperate for oil. It also had almost no ships which could reach Hawaii without refuelling en route, so capturing oil stocks there would be a huge benefit after occupation to use it as a base for operations.

It could also explain why Japan didn't attack the dock facilities to cripple the port and repair capacity when Japan knew its attack in shallow water wouldn't necessarily prevent some ships from being repaired and returned to service.

Then again, doing any of that was beyond the necessary scope of the first wave attack which had to sink ships and neutralise the American air capacity, so the decision not to launch a second wave is a sufficient explanation for the failure to destroy oil storages etc.

Still, the preservation of oil and dock facilities fits equally well with the arguments in the link in my first post that Japan intended to take Hawaii, and more so as Yamamoto was the strategic planner for both Pearl Harbor and, apparently, the Hawaiian occupation. Moreover, Yamamoto is said to have requested on 9 December 1941 a plan for taking Hawaii, which could be consistent with his earlier intention to take Hawaii depending upon the success of the Pearl Harbor attack.

[Deaf Smith]

Originally Posted by Rising Sun*

Still, the preservation of oil and dock facilities fits equally well with the arguments in the link in my first post that Japan intended to take Hawaii, and more so as Yamamoto was the strategic planner for both Pearl Harbor and, apparently, the Hawaiian occupation. Moreover, Yamamoto is said to have requested on 9 December 1941 a plan for taking Hawaii, which could be consistent with his earlier intention to take Hawaii depending upon the success of the Pearl Harbor attack.

But wouldn't the US Army destroy the oil if an invasion was imminent? Surely Yamamoto would consider that as to be expected.

The greatest difficulty Japan would have is supporting the troops landed for any lengthy stay. That's a awful long supply line to go from Japan to Hawaii. A supply line submarines would undoubtedly try to cut.

Consider this, even we had to wait several years to invalid Japan territory with any hope of being able to keep our gains.

Deaf

[royal744]

Sorry, Rising Sun, but no cigar. It simply would have made infinitely more sense and been much easier to invade Hawaii as part of the attack on Pearl Harbor. That they had no marines or army units with them that could have done this was a matter of very poor planning on their part and betrays an entirely naive belief that the shock of this attack would cause the US to whimper in silence. Leaving the oil storage tanks was not premeditated tactic, but rather the consequence of not ordering the second strike which had been planned. The fact that not a single carrier was in the anchorage at the time was the result of poor intelligence and, as it happened, was fatal for the Japanese.

[Firefly]

Originally Posted by royal744

Sorry, Rising Sun, but no cigar. It simply would have made infinitely more sense and been much easier to invade Hawaii as part of the attack on Pearl Harbor. That they had no marines or army units with them that could have done this was a matter of very poor planning on their part and betrays an entirely naive belief that the shock of this attack would cause the US to whimper in silence. Leaving the oil storage tanks was not premeditated tactic, but rather the consequence of not ordering the second strike which had been planned. The fact that not a single carrier was in the anchorage at the time was the result of poor intelligence and, as it happened, was fatal for the Japanese.

Id go along with this. In fact I read recently that the Japanese maritime transport capability couldnt even feed the population of Hawaii let alone a proposed Japanese garrison. I suspect that the Japanese hierarchy knew this as they were not entirely stupid.

[Rising Sun*]

Originally Posted by Firefly

In fact I read recently that the Japanese maritime transport capability couldnt even feed the population of Hawaii let alone a proposed Japanese garrison. I suspect that the Japanese hierarchy knew this as they were not entirely stupid.

The lack of merchant shipping was perhaps the primary single reason Japan lost the war.

It lacked the shipping to maintain and fully exploit its expansion in South East Asia and and the South Pacific, never mind Hawaii. This deficiency was duly compounded by Allied reductions in that shipping and further compounded by Japan's inability to replace those losses.

This led to some desperate but ultimately inefficient measures to try to overcome that lack and those losses, notably the Burma railway which never managed to deliver more than about a third of the intended tonnage to maintain Japan in Burma and supposedly to equip it for the thrust into India. And some other hugely inefficient attempts to compensate such as using submarines, which could carry bugger all compared with a merchant ship, as supply ships to remote posts.

Separately, shipping to feed the Hawaiian population wasn't likely to be an issue. The Japanese wouldn't bother feeding the Hawaiians unless it was in their interests. Much more likely to use them, or at least the non-Japanese elements, as barely fed expendable slave labour as they did everywhere else they went.

Japan's leadership mightn't have been entirely stupid, but it went close as a result of allowing arrogance to blind it to the reality any adequately informed and reasonably dispassionate analysis would have revealed about its ability to win the war, even without the benefit of modern hindsight.

[Nickdfresh]

Your link is broken, RS*.

In any case, I wonder even if the Japanese brought a Naval infantry landing force, if they would have been repelled almost unquestionably. The Japanese tended to underestimate their enemies at points and the initial landing on Wake Island was a near disaster with the first Japanese landing almost wiped out to the man.

Secondly, with the US carriers being away from Pearl, this surely would have complicated any plans for a landing to begin with...

[Deaf Smith]

Does anyone know the U.S. troop strength in Hawaii at the time of Pearl Harbor? Was there a division or regiment? How may costal batteries (14 inch, 8 inch, etc..?)

Could the U.S. have stopped say one full Japanese infantry division, 15,000 men, from landing and holding for several days? I doubt the Japanese could feed that many troops for a long period but could we have repelled them?

I also feel the Japanese, knowing they had to invade Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Java, etc... not to mention China, well they were pretty stretched. So I doubt any prolong stay could have been envisioned. BUT, they could have totally destroyed all the facilities, including all those oil tanks with the Pacific Fleets oil reserves! Maybe a 1000 man commado raid.

Deaf

[cato]

Originally Posted by Deaf Smith

Does anyone know the U.S. troop strength in Hawaii at the time of Pearl Harbor? Was there a division or regiment? How may costal batteries (14 inch, 8 inch, etc..?)

Could the U.S. have stopped say one full Japanese infantry division, 15,000 men, from landing and holding for several days? I doubt the Japanese could feed that many troops for a long period but could we have repelled them?

I also feel the Japanese, knowing they had to invade Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Java, etc... not to mention China, well they were pretty stretched. So I doubt any prolong stay could have been envisioned. BUT, they could have totally destroyed all the facilities, including all those oil tanks with the Pacific Fleets oil reserves! Maybe a 1000 man commado raid.

Deaf

The US had 45,000 troops in Hawaii at the time of PH. The full order of battle can be seen here http://www.usarpac.army.mil/history/dec7_hawndept.asp

BUT--these were peacetime troops--not trained men and the US was woefully poor at having trained soldiers and sailors even well into the war.